Abstract-Recently, there has been much more attention focusing on the evolving networks, whose application domains include Web networks, social networks, communication networks and etc. In this paper, we focus on a financial network, where nodes represent participants of a financial market. Due to lending activities, funds are transferred from one participant to another, and credit-debt relationships between them are formed. With repeated activities, flows of funds are shown in a financial network. We analyze the evolution of funds flows based on evolutionary game theory. Using Lyapunov stability method, we prove that funds flows converge to a relatively stable state, and prove a bound on the convergence time. Finally, we design an ant colony optimization algorithm for a financial network, and use experiments to simulate the evolving process of funds flows.
I. INTRODUCTION
The advances in information technology and globalization have further shaped today's financial system into a complex network. In which the consequences of systemic behavior are hard to predict, as illustrated by the current crisis [1] . For example, the domino effect of the U.S. economic troubles rippled through overseas markets and pushed countries such as Iceland to the verge of bankruptcy. For such a complex system, Bouchaud make a direct appeal in Nature: "Economics needs a scientific revolution" [2] . Therefore, we need a more fundamental analysis to predict changes of the evolving financial networks.
Most real networks -such as Web networks [3] , social networks [4] , communication networks [5] , biological networks [6] and financial networks [7] -evolve in different ways. Generally, the analysis of evolving networks can be divided into three categories [8] . The first is the evolution of network structure, e.g., evolutionary analysis of communities in a social network using different topology measures [9] . The second is evolutionary data mining methods, including clustering [10] , classification, link prediction, etc. The third is the evolution of contents, which refers to understanding evolutionary rules of contents [11] .
In this paper, we analyze the evolving process of funds flows in a financial network, which belongs to the third category. A financial network is composed of participants and their credit-debit relationships in a financial market. Due to lending activities, funds are transferred from one participant to another, and credit-debt relationships between them are formed. With repeated activities, flows of funds are shown in a financial network. Our work is to analyze the trend of flows.
In the realistic financial market, there are a large number of participants that are not fully rational. Their behaviors make the evolution of financial networks more uncertain. But observed on the aggregate level, the fund fluctuation of financial surrounding tends towards stable. For these reasons, a bottomup approach must be implemented to model participants' interaction.
Inspired by evolutionary game theory, we propose an evolutionary model of funds flows to understand participants' decisions of dynamic case, rather than static game [12] . Such a modeling allows us to react to changes of the evolving network. Moreover, in order to simulate the evolving process, a new challenge ahead of us is about efficient computation. To this end, we employ ant colony optimization (ACO) algorithm to complete experiments. Results show that, our optimization of anti-oscillation can improve convergence speed and approximation.
The contributions of this paper are:
• Based on evolutionary game theory, we propose an evolutionary model of funds flows in a financial network.
• By introducing potential function of the financial network [13] , and using Lyapunov stability theorem, we prove evolutionary stability of funds flows and a bound on the convergence time.
• For the evolution of contents, we design a special ACO algorithm, which can improve convergence speed and approximation. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, funds flows are described in a financial network. In Section 3, we propose an evolutionary model of funds flows and stability theories. In Section 4, an ACO algorithm is designed. We provide experiments results in Section 5. We finish with a conclusion.
II. FUNDS FLOWS IN A FINANCIAL NETWORK
In general, participants of a financial market include funds suppliers, funds users, and financial intermediaries. Suppliers and users are composed of individuals or enterprises, and financial intermediaries are composed of banks, securities, etc. One supplier can lend funds to multiple intermediaries, and one user can borrow funds from multiple intermediaries.
Definition 1 (financial network).[14]
A financial network is described by a directed graph ( ) , ,
In path p , funds are transferred over edges si e and iu e , where ( , , ) p s i u = is one of borrowing-lending paths. In a financial network, we assume that total amount of funds is a fixed value D . Suppose that there are l borrowing-lending paths, and denote path set by { } That all funds are transferred through a path is called as a round of lending activities. After a round, funds go back to suppliers, and proceed to a next round. At the end of round t , denote the allocation of all funds path by (t)
x . With repeated rounds, whether (t) x converges to a stable state, whether the state can be solved, and whether a computational experiment can simulate the evolving process, are the problems of our work.
III. EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY OF FUNDS FLOWS

A. Funds Game
Denote the gains of both participants from a lending activity by mn e u , for 1 2 Since participants are selfish, they hope to choose a path of high utility. Moreover, p v is a decreasing function of p x , i.e., if a path is more chosen by participants, the utility of each fund over this path is reduced. It holds that p v is dependent on x . Therefore, a funds game is formed in a financial network.
On macro level, the operation of the financial market is rational, and funds flows tend to a relatively stable state. In order to analyze the equilibrium state of funds game, we introduce Wardrop's first principle [15] . Such a principle is related to the idea of Nash equilibrium for traffic flows in a transportation network that is subject to congestion. When no user may lower his transportation cost through unilateral action, a Wardrop equilibrium is reached. Here, we present the equilibrium concept of financial networks similar to transportation networks.
Definition 2 (Wardrop equilibrium).[15]
An allocation x is at a Wardrop equilibrium of funds game in financial network G , iff for all , p q P ∈ with 0
From
B. Evolutionary Funds Flows
Assumptions made to reach a Wardrop equilibrium cannot be justified in a realistic financial market [16] , e.g.:
• Participants know complete information.
• Participants are rational.
In order to avoid these unrealistic assumptions, we analyze the repeated funds game inspired by evolutionary game theory because of repeated lending activities. We start by deducing a dynamic equation relying on very mild assumptions only. Different from local replicator equation [17] , such an approach focuses on the evolving process. A transfer strategy of funds is devised below.
Suppose that an agent carries the same amount of infinitesimal small funds. Agents hope of higher gains and choose a better path round after round. We suppose that, agents execute replicator dynamics strategies due to bounded rationality. Specially, if an agent chooses path p in last round, it performs two steps to make a choice in a new round [16] .
Step (1): it uniformly samples another agent at random, whose path is q P ∈ in last round.
Step (2) ( )
where
Denote the feasible solution set of (3) 
C. Stability and Convergence
Equation (3) also is replicator dynamics equation of evolutionary game theory. Therefore, a theory of evolutionary stability of funds game is first presented.
Theory 1.[16]
A Wardrop equilibrium is evolutionary stable in a financial network, i.e., if an allocation x is a Wardrop equilibrium, then
y > y y for all best replies y to x , where ⋅ is inner product.
In order to prove convergence, we use the Bechmann potential [15] . Denote the potential function of financial network
When an allocation is a Wardrop equilibrium, its potential function reaches the most value [15] . In (4) Otherwise, a path cannot be chosen, if it is unused at the beginning. Moreover, from the definition of Wardrop equilibrium, it follows that utility of each fund is equal [16] , which is a very strict result. However, our realistic financial surrounding permanently fluctuates. Considering a case that the initial amount of funds over a path is arbitrarily small, and transfer probability of agents on this path is arbitrarily small, then the time of the overall network to reach equilibrium is arbitrarily long. It is impossible to reach the exact equilibrium, unless it is at an equilibrium point at the first time. Therefore, we consider an approximate equilibrium [16] .
, and
Definition 3 can be interpreted as following: Average utilities of almost all paths are almost equal. Furthermore, we give a theory about upper bound for convergence time. Let 1 v λ = in (3). 
IV. EVOLUTIONARY ALGORITHM
The evolving process of funds flows can be interpreted as a repeated routing process of agents in a network, where each agent travels a path round after round. We design an antioscillation ACO algorithm to solve this routing problem [18] .
We extend financial network G to ( )
by adding an original node o and a destination node d ,
. In a round, each agent travels its path from o to d in parallel according to routing table like Tables I.  For a 
A. Employing Ant Colony Algorithm
We employ the ACO routing algorithm in a financial network of this work, which is developed by Di Caro and Dorigo [18] . First action of ACO algorithm is to generate solutions, which are composed of each agent's path. p S is a set of nodes, where an agent has traveled in a round. When locating at node m , an agent moves to next node n until destination node d , according to transfer equations (5) The input of experiments is a financial network. The output includes the rounds of iterations, funds allocation x , average utility value v , and approximation degree x δ . Due to confidentiality of financial data, it is very difficult to construct a real financial network. Therefore, according to economic characteristics of participants, we construct a network by using random number, including 1000 funds suppliers, 500 funds users and 50 financial intermediaries. From statistics by economists, wealth characteristics of individuals is summarized as a power-law distribution [19] , and individuals are enterprises or persons. Whereas wealth of financial intermediaries shows a normal distribution characteristic [20] . Here, we introduce a concept of size factor to measure the wealth for participants. Fig.3 . In early 12 iterations, the curve of v fast tends to the final average. But, the curve of x δ oscillates in subsequent rounds, accidentally drops to the pre-set value, and finally reaches the termination condition of experiment.
From results of this experiment, the primitive ant colony algorithm can be employed to a larger network, and converge to a relatively stable state. But there exits repetitive oscillation.
B. Experiment 2: Optimization of Convergence
The input of experiment 2 is same as the first, but we employ anti-oscillation ACO. Let 0 0.1 q = , 1 α = and 2 β = .
Results of experiment are shown in Fig.4 . After 60 iterations, it reaches approximate equilibrium.
Comparing with the first experiment, the number of round is reduced, and approximate degree is converged to a smaller value. Therefore, we verify that anti-oscillation ACO algorithm can accelerate convergence rate and improve convergence approximation. 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analyze the evolving funds flows of a financial network. In a realistic financial market, the fluctuation of funds is regular. Therefore, we propose an evolutionary model of funds flows to react to these changes. Such an approach is more suitable to shed some light on the evolving process. Such a modeling is helpful to understand the minimum requirements of evolution in a given situation.
We also prove that funds flows converge to approximate equilibrium with time. In addition, an anti-oscillation ACO algorithm is designed to simulate the evolving process for financial networks.
In this paper, we assume that the network structure is fixed. In future, we will consider that, contents and structure evolve simultaneously in a dynamic case.
